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Abstract
We report an experiment that asks whether people in a strategic situation behave accord-
ing to the Golden Rule, i.e., do not treat others in ways that they find disagreeable to
themselves, a property that we call role-reversal consistency. Overall, we find that over
three quarters of the subjects are role-reversal consistent. Regression analysis suggests
that this finding is not driven by players maximizing their subjective expected monetary
earnings given their stated beliefs about their opponents’ behavior. We find that subjects’
stated beliefs and actions reveal mild projection bias.
JEL classification codes: C78; C91.
Keywords: role-reversal consistency; the Golden Rule; elicited beliefs; projection bias.
Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself.
– Confucius
1 Introduction
This paper addresses a general, yet, open issue common to most societies, cultures, and
religions: whether agents’ behavior in an economic environment conforms to the Golden
Rule. The Golden Rule is a central concept about human interaction that has a long
history, and, as put by Blackburn (2001), “can be found in some form in almost every
ethical tradition.”
The form of the Golden Rule most frequently referred to by a wide range of cultures
and religions states that one should not treat others in ways that are not agreeable to
oneself: in The Analects of Confucius, it is said “Never impose on others what you would
not choose for yourself”; In Buddhism, it is said “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself
would find hurtful”; According to the Talmud, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to
your fellow”; According to the Zoroastrian Shayast-na-Shayast, “Whatever is disagreeable
to yourself do not do unto others”; In Islam, the Golden Rule is implicitly expressed in
the Qur’an, but explicitly stated in the Hadith.1 We confine our study to this form of the
Golden Rule (and henceforth, that is what we mean when we refer to the Golden Rule).
The Golden Rule is an ethical norm or a moral principle that approaches strategic
situations in a distinctive way. First, it tells the agent to think about the opposite role.
Second, it suggests to the agent to think how she would behave in the opposite role, rather
than how an abstract opponent would behave in that role. In other words, it dispenses
with the agent’s belief about the behavior of her opponent that is central in game theoretic
reasoning. (However, note that game theoretic reasoning under projection bias (Allport,
1924; Krueger and Acevedo, 2005) results in the agent holding a belief about her opponent’s
behavior that mimics the agent’s own behavior in the opponent’s role.2) Finally, it tells
1The Golden Rule has other interpretations. Its positive form states that one should treat others as
one would like others to treat oneself, as appears in the Bible “So whatever you wish that others would do
to you, do also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets.” van Damme (2014) provides a theoretical
analysis of this positive form of the Golden Rule in a rational choice framework. Bergstrom (2009) describes
four versions of the Golden Rule: “Love-thy-neighbor”, “Do-unto-others”, “Negative do-unto-others” (the
negative form we allude to), and Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
2Projection bias is a well-documented notion in social psychology which says people have the tendency
to project their own thoughts, preferences and behavior onto other people. To the best of our knowledge,
the current study is the first to report evidence for projection bias in a one-shot asymmetric game.
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the agent to take her hypothetical behavior in the opposite role into account in a particular
way, when deciding what to play in her current role.
The idea that an agent should consider how she should play the different roles in a game,
that is key to the Golden Rule, has found its way into the economics literature. Gerchak
and Fuller (1992) offer a first theoretical analysis of the dissolution of business partnerships
that include buy-sell clauses in contracts. According to such clauses, one owner proposes
a buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either purchase the proposer’s shares
or sell her own shares to him at the proposed price. This mechanism embodies the spirit
of the Golden Rule, as the price at which one party proposes to buy out the other is also
the price at which he would have to sell his stake to her. Another mechanism whose game
theoretic solution (in this case its unique subgame perfect equilibrium) agrees with the
Golden rule is the divide-and-choose procedure in fair division (Crawford, 1977; Brams
and Taylor, 1996).
At a more fundamental level, empirical evidence for the Golden Rule provides founda-
tions for recent theoretical and conceptual work. For example, Alger and Weibull (2013)
study the role that the Golden Rule plays in the evolutionary stability of preferences in the
context of assortative matching. Aumann (2008) identifies rule rationality as an important
evolutionary force. Heller and Winter (2015) study the concept of rule rationality, which
allows players to commit to act according to a moral or ideological principle (the Golden
Rule being an examples) in a strategic environment. Smith (2015) argues that equilibrium
as a concept should be defined in the rule space (not in the outcome space), and be based
on (mutual) empathy, in the spirit of Smith (1759, 1982).
The main focus of this paper is to experimentally test the behavioral implications of
the Golden Rule, i.e., treat no one in ways that are disagreeable to yourself. We do this
by asking subjects to play both roles (sequentially, although unaware of this when playing
the first role assigned to them) of a (modified) ultimatum bargaining game, in which each
subject in each role plays multiple opponents simultaneously and independently.
In an ultimatum game, the proposer suggests a division of an amount of money which
the responder either accepts or rejects, with both earning nothing in the latter case. In this
game, the Golden Rule has an intuitive interpretation: an agent playing the responder’s
role accepts the offer she makes as a proposer. To be precise, if an agent when playing the
role of a responder (i.e., when reacting to how others treat her) accepts the offer she would
make as a proposer (i.e., the ways she treats others), then that implies she does NOT treat
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others in ways that she finds not agreeable herself, thereby conforming to the Golden Rule.
We say that such an agent is role-reversal consistent. On the contrary, if an agent when
playing the responder’s role rejects the offer she makes as a proposer, then that implies she
DOES treat others in ways she finds not agreeable, therefore violating the Golden Rule.
The goal of our study is neither to dispute the well known stylized facts of ultimatum
game experiments (see Camerer, 2003 and Gu¨th and Kocher, 2014 for a recent survey) nor
to question any of the models of other-regarding preferences that center their attention
on distributional preferences and/or reciprocity that purport to explain behavior in the
ultimatum and many other games.3
Instead, we study whether subjects’ behavior is role-reversal consistent under the direct-
response method. We are not aware of any prior study that explicitly examines this issue
by eliciting subjects’ behavior using the direct-response method. We also investigate role-
reversal consistency under the strategy method and analyze the extent to which different
variables correlate with it.
Our main findings are as follows.
First, under both elicitation methods, we find that overall 82.0% of the subjects are role-
reversal consistent, which constitutes empirical support for Aumann (2008)’s argument of
rule-rationality as a positive notion, and Smith (2015)’s argument that equilibrium should
be defined in the rule space. Furthermore, our finding that the subjects who act according
to the Golden Rule earn more than the subjects who act differently suggests the need of
further studies to compare the efficiency levels of different rules.
Second, the direct-response method, where subjects have real-time information about
others’ reactions to the way they treat them or how others treat them, yields a higher
level of role-reversal consistency, 93.0%, than the strategy method, 72.7%, where such
information is suppressed.
Third, regression analysis suggests that the high rate of role-reversal consistency is not
driven by subjects choosing the offers that maximize their subjective expected monetary
3Our interpretation of the Golden Rule has different implications for different models. For example,
in the standard “selfish” model, where subjects are assumed to maximise their own monetary payoffs, all
offers are consistent with the Golden Rule. The only restriction of the model is that the subject as a
responder would never reject any offer, namely the offer he made as a proposer. The offer he made would
simply maximize his expected monetary earnings given his beliefs about the responder. This is in line with
the Golden Rule. In the “inequality aversion” model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for a strategy
profile to conform with the Golden Rule, the level of inequality implied by a subject’s offer must not be
greater than the level of inequality the subject will be willing to accept as a responder.
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earnings, given their stated beliefs about the responders’ behavior. When analyzing sub-
jects’ stated beliefs and actions we find mild evidence of projection bias, a particularly
interesting finding given that the players’ roles in the game are asymmetric.
Finally, we do not find that any of the demographic (including gender), socio-economic
or cultural variables we collect data on has a significant effect on the level of role-reversal
consistency, although the sample is large (300 subjects) for a laboratory experiment.
2 Related literature
Earlier papers have asked subjects to play both roles of a two-person game under a variety
of different protocols from ours. Gu¨th, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) describe a
treatment where each subject simultaneously decides how much to offer as a proposer and
the minimum offer she accepts as a responder. They find that 86.5% of the subjects are,
in their own terminology, “consistent”, because the sum of their offer and the minimum
acceptable offer is smaller than the amount to be divided.4
Later, Oxoby and McLeish (2004) ask subjects to specify a complete strategy profile
in the ultimatum game, both writing down the offer they would make as a proposer and
answering whether they would accept or reject each feasible offer (they use a $10 pie, and
restrict offers to whole dollar amounts). They compare subjects’ aggregate behavior in this
treatment with behavior in another treatment where subjects are assigned one of the two
roles and play an ultimatum game using the direct-response method, i.e., with the proposer
making an offer that is conveyed to the responder who either accepts it or not. Blanco,
Engelmann and Normann (2011) also ask subjects to play both roles simultaneously in the
ultimatum game using the strategy method. Neither of these two studies analyzes whether
a subject would accept her own offer nor uses the direct-response method.
Chai, Dolgosuren, Kim, Liu and Sherstyuk (2011) use role-reversal in one of their
treatments, but do not study subjects’ role-reversal consistency. Furthermore, their design
is not suited to understand the effects that feedback, and the order according to which the
two roles are played by each subject, have on role-reversal consistency. Their main aim is
to correlate behavior with attitudinal responses.5
4Although role-reversal was first used in the context of the ultimatum game, its use has spread to other
games and to issues as varied as the inferring of subjects’ distributional preferences, as in Charness and
Rabin (2002).
5They run two treatments (which they call one-role and two-roles treatments) with several games,
among them the ultimatum game. In their one-role treatment subjects play either the role of proposer
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Our study differs from all the studies above. We use the direct-response method (in
addition to the strategy method), which reflects the conflicting nature of the strategic
situation more naturally, even if it makes it harder to test role-reversal consistency, as
explained below. We do not constrain responders to play a cut-off strategy, because we
want to avoid cuing subjects to choose an offer and a cut-off strategy that sum up to
an amount not larger than the pie. Subjects play one role at a time, rather than both
roles simultaneously, as real-life situations are better described through sequential, not
simultaneous, play of opposite roles. We eliminate the 50-50 split of the pie outcome
because its focalness might nudge subjects’ behavior to be role-reversal consistent. We
also elicit the proposer’s beliefs about the probability of acceptance of each offer, as we
aim to understand whether subjects’ beliefs about the responder’s role are related to how
they play that role. The data we collect allows us to answer whether subjects’ behavior is
role-reversal consistent and to identify factors that influence such behavior.
Celen, Schotter and Blanco (2016) (henceforth CSB) propose an innovative framework
to provide a formal definition of “kindness” – a notion that is often personal and contextual.
Their concept of “kindness” is based on blame and makes reference to what a player would
do in her opponent’s role. A subject’s judgement of whether her opponent is kind or unkind
to her, requires her to compare the strategy played by her opponent with the strategy
she would herself play in her opponent’s role (if she would have acted in a more unkind
manner than her opponent actually does, then her opponent is blame-free; otherwise, her
opponent is blameworthy). With an emphasis on “blame” which relies on a player’s would-
be behavior in her opponent’s role and “her belief of her opponent’s behavior”, not only
do they cleverly incorporate a player’s judgement of her opponent’s behavior into her own
preferences, but also add a “blame” stage to two games (dictator game and public goods
game) to experimentally test whether a player’s behavior is blame-free or blameworthy in
various situations.
Although the Golden Rule is not as widely applicable as CSB’s notion of ”kindness”,
we use its role-reversal consistency prediction in the ultimatum game, to help us contrast
both. Role-reversal consistency emphasizes how the player’s behavior in her opponent’s
role relates to her behavior in the current role, rather than focus on the player’s judgment of
or responder. In their two-roles treatment, they use a role-reversal protocol in which subjects play the
proposer role first, and next specify a cut-off strategy for the role of responder. They find that the average
offer is the same in the one-role and two-roles treatments and also that the order according to which
subjects play the two roles does not affect the average offer made as a proposer.
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her opponent’s behavior. Therefore, role-reversal consistency does not focus on the player’s
belief about her opponent’s behavior, or on whether the player would blame her opponent
for his behavior, but instead focuses on whether the player in her opponent’s shoes would
blame herself. Role-reversal consistency is rooted in introspection since it focuses on how
the player’s behavior would be judged by herself, and how such judgment would influence
her behavior in her current role. Hence, our experiment focuses on how a subject plays one
role, and how she reacts when playing the opposite role to others behaving like she does
in the former role.
3 Experimental design
Our experimental design tweaks the standard version of the ultimatum game to test
whether a subject does not treat others in ways that she finds disagreeable to herself,
which we call “role-reversal consistency”. To conduct this test we ask subjects to play
both roles of the ultimatum game. To avoid inadvertently nudging subjects to simulta-
neously think how they would play both roles, subjects are asked to play one role first,
unaware that they will be asked to play the other role next.
Furthermore, we believe that the principle of Never impose on others what you find not
agreeable to yourself reflects better the way people should behave when interacting with
different people, than when interacting with the same person repeatedly. Indeed, we use
the term role-reversal to refer to the former type of interaction, and refer to the latter as
role-switching. Role-reversal eliminates reciprocity across games (apart from anonymous
reciprocity) which is likely to arise in a role-switching situation.
In the experiment, each subject is first assigned either the role of proposer or responder.
The proposer chooses an offer amount that is conveyed separately and independently to
ten responders. This maximizes the probability that we can test a subject’s role-reversal
consistency (which requires a subject as a responder to be offered the amount she offers as
a proposer). Each subject in the role of responder receives simultaneous and independent
offers from ten proposers and decides whether to accept or reject each of them. The pro-
poser is then informed of the responders’ decisions. Next, each subject plays the opposite
role. We refer to this set of procedures as the direct-response treatment.
In our games players bargain over £7, but offers can only be made in whole (i.e., integer)
sterling amounts (£0, £1, . . . , £7). We use this feature for several reasons: i) to make it
impossible for the pie to be split evenly, which is a very frequent outcome in ultimatum
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game experiments. The availability of this outcome could yield a high level of role-reversal
consistent behavior, but it would confound the role-reversal consistency interpretation with
all the other explanations (ranging from pure inequality aversion to such outcome being the
focal point in a bargaining situation).6 To avoid this confoundedness we only allow unequal
splits of the pie. This sharpens the study of role-reversal consistency; ii) to increase the
probability that a subject when playing the responder role is offered the amount she herself
offers as a proposer; iii) to be able to elicit a proposer’s beliefs about the probability of
acceptance of each possible offer; iv) to be able to use the strategy method in a different
treatment (explained in a section below), where the responder has to decide whether to
accept or reject each of the feasible offer amounts.
We conducted five sessions of the direct-response treatment (and another five sessions
using the strategy method, which we describe in detail in subsection 4.1) (with 30 subjects
in each session selected from the undergraduate student population at a UK university
and from many different majors with the exception of Economics to exclude subjects who
had been exposed to game theory). Subjects interacted with each other only via z-tree’s
computer interface (Fischbacher, 2007). Their identity and experimental ID number were
kept strictly confidential from each other throughout and after the experiment to ensure
anonymity. The detailed procedures of each session are as follows.
Subjects were randomly divided into three groups of ten (A, B and C). They were told
that the session had three independent parts, and that each group would participate in
two parts, interacting with a different group in each part. Subjects were not described the
decision situation they would face in a part before they got to it.
In part I, group A subjects played group B subjects, the former as proposers, the latter
as responders, while group C subjects were passive. In part II, group A subjects became
responders and played group C subjects who were proposers, and group B subjects were
passive. In part III, group B subjects became proposers and played group C subjects who
became responders, and group A subjects were passive. The passivity of one group in
each part reinforced to the subjects in each group the fact that they would only interact
once with the subjects from each of the other two groups. This rotation of the groups
suppresses reciprocity-driven behavior across games. The structure of a session’s different
6Gu¨th, Huck and Muller (2001) compare behavior between mini-ultimatum games with and without
the equal-split option. They find that proposers choose unfair offers more often when the equal-split option
is not available. We thank Matthias Sutter for highlighting this possible confoundedness, which ultimately
led us to drop the equal-split outcome from the set of feasible offers.
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parts is summarized in Table 1 and in Figure 1 (a).
Table 1: The structure of the experiment
Group Role Previous Role
Part I
A Proposer None
B Responder None
Part II
C Proposer None
A Responder Proposer
Part III
B Proposer Responder
C Responder Proposer
In each part, each proposer made an offer that was sent to all 10 responders. Accord-
ingly, each responder received 10 offers all at once, one from each proposer (as illustrated
in Figure 1 (b) and (c)). She then had to decide whether to accept or reject each of them,
and submitted all her decisions at the same time. This allowed her to both accept and
reject offers of the same amount.7 Overall, each subject made one offer as the proposer
and 10 decisions as the responder.
Each proposer, after making her offer (but before the game’s outcome is revealed and she
plays the responder’s role), stated her beliefs about the responder’s conditional probability
of acceptance for each feasible offer (i.e., for all the whole amounts between £0 and £7).
We used a quadratic scoring rule to elicit beliefs, a mechanism that is incentive compatible
under the assumption of risk-neutral expected utility maximization.
We determined subjects’ earnings at the end of the experiment (to suppress wealth
effects as much as possible). We paid each subject for: i) the outcomes of two randomly
chosen responses to her offer as a proposer (see the thick arrows in Figure 1 (b)); ii) the
outcomes of her decisions as a responder to two randomly chosen offers (see the thick
7Although there is evidence that a responder does not always accept or reject a particular amount, it
comes from experiments in which subjects play the ultimatum game repeatedly (either against the same
proposer or different proposers). In such experiments this behavior can be explained by the responder
dynamically adjusting her behavior given the history of offers she receives to either teach proposers to
increase their offers or because she learns to accept lower offers. Our design rules out such explanations.
In our design, the observation that a responder accepts some while rejecting other offers of the same
amount is either evidence of her indifference (if that happens only for one amount), or of her choice being
stochastic (if the responder acts in that way for different offer amounts).
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arrows in Figure 1 (c)); iii) the accuracy with which she estimates that each of two offers
randomly selected from all ten offers made by the proposers in her group is accepted by one
randomly chosen responder from the opposite group, with a maximum of £1 per estimate.8
GROUP A
GROUP C GROUP B
Part IPart II
Part III
(a) Structure of the experiment
GROUP A GROUP B
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a8
a9
a10
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
b10
(b) Proposer’s perspective
GROUP A GROUP B
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a8
a9
a10
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
b10
(c) Responder’s perspective
Figure 1: The experimental design
At the end of the session subjects completed a questionnaire, after which they collected
their monetary earnings.9 Excluding a show-up fee of £3 and the average earnings from
the belief elicitation task of £1.7, the average payment was £12.0, and the highest and
lowest payments were £18 and £3, respectively.
8This reward mechanism deals with hedging because it yields a very low (4%) probability that the
same outcome of the subject’s interaction with an opponent is chosen to reward her decision as a proposer
and her stated beliefs. In addition, so far there is little empirical evidence that such concerns matter (see
Blanco, Engelmann, Koch and Normann, 2010). Unlike what would happen with role-switching, in our
design subjects would find it hard to maximize the minimum earnings from playing both roles, as they
face different opponents in each role and are paid for just two (out of ten) randomly chosen interactions
in each role at the end of the session.
9The questionnaire collects information on basic demographic data such as age, gender, and major
of study, life-experience variables such as paid and non-paid work (e.g. charity) experiences, and other
socio-economic and family background variables like the financial situation, number of siblings and being
religious. We use these data to control for factors associated with moral/cultural influences on decision
making.
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4 Role-Reversal Consistent Behavior
In this section, we analyze each subject’s behavior as a proposer and a responder jointly. We
present a summary of the proposer’s offer, the responder’s decisions (i.e., the responder’s
empirical acceptance rates for the different offers), and the proposer’s stated beliefs (i.e.,
her estimates for the responder’s acceptance rates) in Table 2, sorted according to the
role played first (Groups A and C first played as proposer, while Group B first played as
responder). Subjects as proposers offer an average of £3.29. Offers of £3 or more are
almost always accepted, with lower offers mostly being rejected. Proposers underestimate
the probability of acceptance of all offers except for £6, which is rarely offered. The data
shows subjects’ decisions as proposers and responders do not depend on which role they
played first. We provide a more detailed analysis in the Appendix.
Table 2: Proposer’s offer, proposer’s beliefs and responder’s decisions
£0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 Avg. offer
Number of offers
Group A&C 2 1 4 52 36 3 2 0 £3.36
Group B 0 3 5 28 12 0 2 0 £3.14
Empirical acceptance rates
Group A&C 0.100 0.500 0.400 0.883 0.964 1.000 0.850 –
Group B – 0.233 0.440 0.964 1.000 – 0.950 –
Estimated acceptance rates
Group A&C 0.013 0.127 0.284 0.618 0.865 0.941 0.973 0.990
Group B 0.047 0.240 0.400 0.743 0.877 0.943 0.979 0.986
In our ultimatum game design, role-reversal consistent behavior is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 A subject is role-reversal consistent if she always accepts the offer she
makes as a proposer. She is role-reversal inconsistent if she rejects that offer at least
once.
The rejection of an offer reflects the subject’s dislike of being treated that way. Thus,
when a subject makes an offer to others that she herself rejects as a responder, she treats
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others in a way she herself does not find agreeable, and therefore violates the Golden Rule.
On the other hand, when a subject accepts an offer equal to the amount she herself offers
as a proposer, it implies that she does not treat others in a way that is disagreeable to
herself. Thus, whether a subject accepts the offer she makes as proposer is what determines
whether she is role-reversal consistent. Note that a subject who rejects an offer higher than
the offer she makes is not role-reversal inconsistent, so long as a responder she accepts the
amount she herself offered. When the subject is never offered the offer she makes, we
cannot conclude anything about her role-reversal consistency.10
In our data, after excluding the 22 subjects who are not offered the amount they
offer as a proposer, the large majority of the subjects, 93.0% (=119/128) is role-reversal
consistent.11 This finding indicates that in an ultimatum game-like strategic situation, the
large majority of subjects’ behavior conforms to the principle of “do not treat others in a
way that is disagreeable to yourself”.
This finding is in line with that of Gu¨th et al. (1982), although our and their exper-
imental designs are different. We discuss the connections between Gu¨th et al. (1982)’s
finding and ours in more details in the Appendix.
Finding that most subjects are role-reversal consistent raises two questions: one is
which variables, if any, explain why people behave that way; the other is to ask whether
consistent and inconsistent subjects perform differently.
We start with the latter. We find that a consistent subject earns an average of £6.38 per
pair of proposer/responder decisions, a higher figure than the one earned by inconsistent
subjects (£5.77). The null hypothesis of identical earnings of consistent and inconsistent
subjects is rejected using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p-value=0.044).
4.1 Role-Reversal Consistency under the Strategy Method
We conduct a treatment of our modified ultimatum game under the strategy method
to test wether subjects’ behavior conform to the Golden Rule when they play the two roles
10For example, consider a subject who as a proposer makes an offer of £3. Suppose 6 of the 10 offers
she receives as a responder are equal to £3. If the subject accept all the 6 offers of £3, we say she is
role-reversal consistent; otherwise, if she rejects one or more of the 6 offers of £3, we call her role-reversal
inconsistent. If, on the other hand, none of the 10 offers she receives as a responder equals £3, we cannot
conclude anything about the subject’s role-reversal consistency.
11In our data, a large majority (144 out of 150) of subjects’ behavior as responders is monotonic, (i.e. if
a responder accepts an offer of X, he would never reject offers greater than X). If we exclude the subjects
who as responders violate monotonicity, the role-reversal consistency level increases to 95.1%.
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in a “cold” environment.
The strategy method treatment follows the direct-response treatment with two main
exceptions: i) for each of the 10 proposers, the responder has to decide whether to accept
or reject each of the 8 offer amounts, without knowing the actual offer; ii) subjects only
learn the actions played by their opponents (and therefore, the outcomes of the game) at
the end of the experiment, i.e., after they have played both roles.12 Under the strategy
method, and unlike under direct-response method, we can always test whether a subject
is role-reversal consistent, because in the responder’s role she is asked to accept or reject
each of the eight feasible offer amounts, which necessarily includes the amount she offers
as a proposer.
To facilitate comparisons with the direct-response treatment, the offer that each pro-
poser made was sent to all 10 responders in the strategy method treatment. Accordingly,
each responder was asked to decide whether she would accept or reject any of the feasible
eight offer amounts for each of the 10 proposers. She was neither constrained to choose a
cut-off strategy (e.g. could reject high offers and accept low ones) nor to accept or reject
a particular (hypothetical) amount for all 10 proposers.13 In other words, when a subject
played the responder role, she could either use the same or different strategies to play the
ten different proposers. However, to alleviate the burden of repetition and to partly con-
trol for decision noise (which results in the subject mistakenly both accepting and rejecting
offers of the same amount other than at the cut-off) across both treatments, the subject
could play the strategy she had played against the previous proposer by clicking a button
on the screen. Alternatively, she could specify a (different or the same) strategy anew by
entering a decision for each feasible offer amount, which means that subjects in the role of
responders could make as many as 80 decisions or as few as 8 if they clicked the “copy the
previous strategy button” from her 2nd to 10th match with the proposers.14 A summary
12Often researchers (e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2000) refer to the “strategy method” and “direct-
response” protocols as “cold” and “hot”. For a survey of similarities and differences in players’ behavior
under the two methods, see the survey by Brandts and Charness (2011).
13Not constraining responders to use cut-off strategies provides a clean comparison of their behavior
between the two treatments. In addition, a few past studies (see Roth, Okuno-Fujiwara, Prasnikar and
Zamir, 1991) document that some subjects reject very high offers, which reinforces the appropriateness of
eliciting an unconstrained strategy.
1470 out of 150 subjects make their accept/reject decisions for the first proposer and then simply press a
key to automatically play them in each of the pairings with the other nine proposers. Another 55 subjects
click the “copy” button 6, 7 or 8 out of the 9 times they could use it. So, if these subjects do not play the
same strategy against all the proposers, they do so deliberately, not as the result of decision noise.
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of the data of the strategy method treatment with detailed analysis is presented in the
Appendix.
We find that the relative frequency of role-reversal subjects is statistically significantly
lower (p − value of 0.000 in a Fisher’s exact test) in the strategy method treatment than
in the direct-response treatment, 72.7% vs. 93.0%.15 This difference cannot be explained
by the fact that in the direct-response treatment subjects who make low offers are less
often offered the amount they themselves offer at least once than the subjects who make
higher offers. Even if we were to assume that subjects who offered £0, £1 and £2 would
themselves reject such offers, a Fisher’s exact test would yield a low p-value (0.0039), thus
rejecting the null hypothesis that the proportion of role-reversal consistent subjects is the
same in the two treatments.16
In order to control for any difference in the level of decision noise between the two
treatments, we compare the consistency rates of the sub-sample of subjects who use de-
terministic strategies as responders (i.e., make the same decision for all offers of the same
amount).17 In our study, 134 (89.3%) and 79 (52.7%) subjects play deterministic strategies
as responders in the direct-response and strategy treatments, respectively.18 The difference
between the role-reversal consistency rates is statistically significant (100% and 92.4% in
the direct-response and strategy treatments, respectively, and a p− value of 0.004).
Even if we were to allow more decision noise in the strategy treatment by classifying as
role-reversal consistent a subject who rejects up to 3 (out of the 10) times the offer amount
he makes, the consistency level increases from 72.7% to 82.0%, which is still statistically
different from 93.0% (p− value of 0.007 in a Fisher’s exact test).
Given that across the two treatments one third of the responders do not employ a
15As in the direct-response treatment, role-reversal consistent subjects earn more than inconsistent
subjects, £5.93 vs. £4.95, in the strategy method treatment. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test yields a
p− value of 0.000. The average payment in the strategy treatment (excluding a show-up fee of £3 and the
average earnings from the belief elicitation task of £1.6) was £11.4 in the other treatment. The highest
and lowest payment (also excluding the show-up fee and the earnings from the belief elicitation task) in
the strategy method treatment were £17 and £0, respectively.
16Out of the 22 subjects in the direct-response treatment who are never offered the amount, 1,4,6,5,3
and 3 subjects offered £0, £1, £2, £4, £5 and £6, respectively.
17We thank Dirk Engelmann and two anonymous referees for these suggestions.
18The 71 subjects who play the non-deterministic strategies do not change their strategies very often
either: 67.6% (48) of them still automatically copy one of the strategies they play more than 6 out of 9
times. Interestingly, we find that subjects who have the experience of being a proposer before being a
responder (subjects in groups A and C), use deterministic strategies more often than subjects (in group
B) who do not have such experience, 61.0% vs. 36.0% (a Fisher’s exact test yields a p-value of 0.005).
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deterministic strategy, we next determine the role-reversal consistency of the subjects who
employ a cut-off strategy that is deterministic everywhere except at the cut-off (an amount
that the subject sometimes accepts and other times rejects, perhaps due to indifference),
which we call a monotonic strategy. In other words, a responder’s strategy is monotonic
if s/he accepts all offers greater than x, where x is the lowest offer the subject (sometimes
or always) accepts. In the direct-response and strategy treatments 144 (96%) and 104
(69.33%) subjects use monotonic strategies as responders, respectively.19 The role-reversal
consistency rate of the group of subjects who use monotonic strategies as responders is
different in the direct-response treatment (95.1%) and the strategy treatment (82.7%)
(p− value = 0.004).
Thus, the treatment effect can at least in part be attributed to subjects’ compliance with
the Golden Rule being lower when they are aware that their actions are not immediately
observed by their opponents. It seems that the relatively “cold” situation of the strategy
method hinders the conformity to the principle of “do not treat others in a way that you
find disagreeable”. Our result also contributes to the discussion of rule salience in different
situations. Smith (2015) offers an interpretation of Adam Smith’s rule following conduct,
which suggests that through judging others’ actions, people learn that others will judge
their actions in the same manner. The lower level of role-reversal consistency under the
strategy method is consistent with the hypothesis that when the rules of conduct are less
salient as in the strategy method treatment, compliance with them is lower.
4.2 What Drives Role-Reversal Consistency?
We use a probit regression to regress a dummy variable of the subject’s role-reversal
consistent behavior on a series of variables that capture different features of the strategies
the subject played and on demographic, socio-economic and life-experience related variables
to further determine variables that influence role-reversal consistent behavior.
19Other studies have also reported a high percentage of monotonic strategies. In Gu¨th, Schmidt and
Sutter (2003), only a small proportion (9%) of subjects tend to reject offers above the equal split. However,
Hennig-Schmidt, Li and Yang (2008) report that only 17 out of 36 responder groups chose monotonic
strategies in their group-decision making ultimatum game experiment with the strategy method. In our
experiment, among all non-monotonic subjects, half of them reject relatively high offers, while the rest are
indecisive about relatively low offers. With respect to those 6 subjects whose strategies are not monotonic
in the direct-response treatment, 3 of them reject offers of £5 or higher and the other 3 reject offers of £3
or £4 while accepting lower offers. In the strategy treatment, 27 out of 46 non-monotonic subjects reject
offer of £5 or higher at least once. Among the remaining 19 subjects, 7 are non-monotonic only on offers
lower than £2, while the others’ strategies are not systematic for offers up to £4.
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Before doing so, we discuss the possible confounding between role-reversal consistent
behavior and the proposer behaving strategically under the assumptions of risk-neutrality
and own-payoff maximization, in which case she offers the amount that maximizes her
subjective (i.e., uses her stated beliefs about the responder’s behavior) expected monetary
earnings (henceforth, we call this amount the expected monetary earnings maximizing
offer, EMEMO).20 For the confounding to occur, the subject as a proposer has to offer
the EMEMO, the EMEMO has to be an amount the subject never rejects as a responder
(otherwise she would not be role-reversal consistent), and the subject has to engage in
projection bias.
In our experiment, projection bias implies that the agent holds a belief about her
opponent’s behavior that mimics the agent’s own behavior in the opponent’s role. Note
that conforming to the Golden Rule does not imply engaging in projection bias. The
latter requires the proposer’s belief about the responder to coincide with the subject’s own
would-be behavior as the responder. The former requires that the subject’s strategy as a
responder is related to her own behavior as a proposer, not to the belief she holds about
to the responder’s behavior when she plays the proposer’s role. Our data suggests the
presence of projection bias, for two reasons: first, in the strategy method treatment, we
find that subjects’ stated probabilities of acceptance are not statistically different from their
behavior, for most of the feasible offer amounts; second, the subject’s stated probability
of acceptance goes up significantly from the highest offer she rejected to the lowest offer
she accepted as a responder. Although this evidence is suggestive of projection bias, it
is not definitive because we cannot apply the statistical tests to all the subjects in both
treatments, as explained in the detailed analysis provided in the Appendix.
When a subject who engages in projection bias offers her EMEMO, and always accepts
that amount as a responder, we cannot determine whether the subject is role-reversal
consistent or strategic.21 On the other hand, there is no confounding when the subject’s
20We first identify for each subject her EMEMO given her stated beliefs about the responder’s probability
of acceptance of the feasible offers, which we call the expected monetary earnings maximizing offer. Our
working assumption is that subjects state their beliefs truthfully, even if Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker’s
(2008) results suggest that might not always be the case. There are 16 subjects whose stated beliefs
yield two EMEMOs. If the subject’s offer is one of these two amounts, we say that the subject offers her
EMEMO. There are 3 subjects whose offers are in between their two EMEMOs. We exclude these subjects
from the analysis, as their behavior cannot be explained by their risk attitude under the CRRA model
(i.e. there does not exist a risk parameter such that the subject’s offer gives him the highest utility given
his stated beliefs of the probabilities that different offers being accepted).
21The following example illustrates a set of circumstances in which the confounding occurs: a subject
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offer differs from her EMEMO, even when the subject engages in projection bias. Hence,
we focus our attention on the effect that the subject offering her EMEMO has on the
probability of her being role-reversal consistent in the regression analysis. We do this
through a regressor labeled as EMEM, which is a binary variable that indicates whether
the subject’s offer coincides with her EMEMO.
We also include a subject’s offer as a proposer in the regression because we expect
that the higher the offer a subject makes as a proposer the higher the probability that
she will accept it as a responder, and therefore the higher the probability that she is role-
reversal consistent. The binary variable of whether the subject’s strategy as a responder
is monotonic is included because cut-off strategies play such a huge role in the bargaining
literature, and because such behavior reveals that a subject has clear preferences as to
what offers to accept and reject (with the possible exception of the cut-off).
We include a dummy variable “Direct-Response” for the treatment the subject took
part in to account for the treatment effect discussed in the previous section. The other
variables that are related to the subject’s behavior in the experiment are the subjects’
decision times as a proposer and as a responder.22
The results in Table 3 show that a higher offer, and playing a monotonic strategy
as a responder, have a positive effect on role-reversal consistency.23 The direct-response
treatment also yields a higher consistency level, which confirms the non-parametric analysis
above. The results also confirm that behaving strategically, i.e., choosing the offer that
maximizes one’s expected monetary earnings, does not explain the high rate of role-reversal
consistency (the variable EMEM is not significant in either regression), and therefore allows
us to say that the observed behavior is not driven by any possible confounding of these
two explanations in our study.
as a proposer offers £4, and as a responder uses a cut-off strategy with £4 as the cut-off. Such subject is
role-reversal consistent. Under projection bias her beliefs as a proposer mimic her cut-off strategy. With
such beliefs, the subject’s EMEMO is also £4. Therefore, strategic behavior as described above would be
confounded with role-reversal consistent behavior.
22We treat the responder’s decision time differently in the two treatments. In the direct-response treat-
ment it is the time taken to decide on all 10 offers (often some offers are equal to each other) received. In
the strategy treatment it is time spent entering a strategy, i.e., a contingent decision for each of the eight
feasible offers for each proposal averaged across the 10 proposals. If when specifying a strategy to play a
proposer the subject simply invokes the strategy she specified for the previous proposer, the decision time
spent for that proposal is assumed to be zero.
23The 22 inconclusive subjects and the 3 subjects whose offers lie between their two EMEMOs are
excluded in regressions 1 and 2; in addition, the 14 other subjects who did not complete the post-experiment
questionnaire are excluded in regression 2.
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Among the proposer’s and the responder’s decision time variables (the latter sorted ac-
cording to treatment) in the regression, the responder’s decision time in the direct-response
treatment is the only one whose statistical significance is robust to the specification chosen.
Its coefficient is negative, thus suggesting that taking longer to decide is negatively corre-
lated with role-reversal consistent behavior. An intuitive explanation for this is that the
moral principle behind role-reversal consistency is simple and easy to apply. A longer deci-
sion time might reflect the individual taking into account a variety of (possibly competing)
considerations when deciding, or her use of harder to apply heuristics.
We find that none of the demographic, socio-economic, life-experience, and family re-
lated variables affect role-reversal consistency.
Table 3: Role-reversal consistency probit regressions
(1) (2)
Offer 0.079**(3.69) 0.070**(3.39)
Monotonicity 0.256**(3.74) 0.240**(3.56)
EMEM 0.078 (1.85) 0.098 (1.66)
Direct-Response 0.157* (2.14) 0.159* (2.24)
Prop.time 0.002 (1.78) 0.003 (1.92)
Resp.timerm -0.002* (2.40) -0.001* (2.22)
Resp.timesm -0.001 (1.15) -0.001 (1.10)
Age 0.014 (1.31)
Gender -0.010 (0.25)
Quant. major -0.029 (0.71)
Native Speaker 0.012 (0.21)
Work experience -0.022 (0.41)
Charity experience -0.010 (0.24)
Has siblings 0.103 (1.43)
# Rooms at home -0.073 (1.84)
# Family cars 0.033 (1.32)
# Observations 275 261
Coefficients are marginal effects estimates; Absolute value of z statistics in brackets: * (**) significant at 5% (1%).
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5 Conclusion
This paper reports an experiment that tests whether people treat others in ways that they
find disagreeable themselves in a strategic situation. In the experiment, each subject plays
both roles of a (modified) ultimatum game and states her beliefs as a proposer about
the responder’s behavior either under the direct-response or the strategy method. In our
design, each subject when playing as a proposer makes the same offer amount to multiple
responders simultaneously, and when playing as a responder receives offers from multiple
proposers, in a way that preserves the one-shot nature of the interaction.
Overall, we find that the majority of subjects are role-reversal consistent, a finding that
is not driven by subjects behaving strategically as proposers (i.e., choosing the offer that
maximizes their expected monetary earnings given their stated beliefs about the responder’s
behavior). We find that the direct-response method produces a substantially higher level
of role-reversal consistency than the strategy method, adding to the discussion of norm
compliance in “hot” and “cold” situations. A larger offer and a monotonic response to
others’ offers are more likely to produce role-reversal consistent behavior. Subjects who
take longer to decide as responders in the direct-response method are less likely to be
role-reversal consistent. In addition, role-reversal consistent subjects earn more money
than inconsistent subjects. Interestingly, we find mild evidence for projection bias, since
subjects’ beliefs about the responders’ behavior mimic their own actions as responders.
Finally, the observation that a large proportion of subjects is role-reversal consistent
indicates that models of strategic interactions that do not rely on common knowledge of
rationality, but instead assume that an agent decides considering how she would play the
opponent’s role, can be useful to predict behavior. Such line of inquiry might be appealing
when an agent knows very little about her opponents’ preferences, personalities, and so on.
It remains to be seen to what extent and how it would be possible to increase the com-
pliance with the Golden Rule. Some field experiments suggests that a simple “reminder”
improves compliance with certain norms. For example, Apesteguia, Funk and Iriberri
(2013) study a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona and find
that a general reminder of the users’ duty is effective in promoting rule compliance.
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Appendix A Further Data Analysis (for Online Pub-
lication Only)
In this section, we provide additional details of the analysis of subjects’ behavior in both
roles, and also check order effects on subjects’ behavior as proposers and responders.
In Table 4, we present a series of summary statistics of the experimental data (namely,
the proposer’s average offer, subjects’ average sum of earnings as proposer and responder,
the percentage of role-reversal consistent subjects, the percentage of subjects whose strate-
gies as a responder are monotonic, the subjects’ Average Expected Monetary Maximizing
Offer (the average of the subjects’ EMEMOs), the average decision time as a proposer and
the average decision time as a responder). In Table 5, we present the detailed data from
the strategy method treatment.
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Experimental Data by Treatment and Session
Avg. offer Avg. earnings % role-reversal % Monotononic EMEMO Proposer dec. Responder dec.
(£) (£) consistent subjects strategies (£) time (sec.) time (sec.)
Direct-Response Treatment
Session 1 3.70 12.57 96.30 93.33 3.60 30.50 56.23
Session 2 3.23 12.83 90.91 100 3.37 33.80 86.37
Session 3 3.13 11.33 92.59 100 3.20 25.50 58.90
Session 4 3.20 12.00 88.46 96.67 2.87 23.20 63.50
Session 5 3.16 11.27 96.15 90.00 3.30 42.50 66.97
Strategy Method Treatment
Session 1 3.20 11.33 70.00 66.66 3.13 25.37 58.10
Session 2 3.07 11.76 70.00 80.00 3.43 19.70 53.40
Session 3 2.76 11.67 76.67 63.33 3.27 16.67 48.37
Session 4 2.83 10.60 70.00 70.00 3.37 15.87 34.90
Session 5 2.87 11.50 76.67 66.67 3.10 19.43 56.27
We now test for order effects of the proposer’s behavior. Within each treatment, we do
not find a statistical significant (at the 5% level) difference (using a Fligner-Policello robust
rank order test) of the offers made by the subjects in groups A and C (this is expected
since subjects in these groups first play the proposer’s role) in both treatments. Within
each treatment we do not find any evidence of any order effect in the offer distributions,
when we compared the pooled offers of groups A and C with the group B’s offers.
Finally, we test for order effects of the responder’s behavior. Within each treatment
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Table 5: Strategy method treatment: proposer’s offer, proposer’s beliefs and responder’s
decisions
£0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 Mean offer
Number of offers
Group A&C 6 0 16 49 26 2 0 1 £3.00
Group B 2 2 9 26 11 0 0 0 £2.84
Empirical acceptance rates
Group A&C 0.084 0.343 0.555 0.913 0.983 0.987 0.972 0.949
Group B 0.032 0.230 0.478 0.872 0.954 0.902 0.856 0.78
Estimated acceptance rates
Group A&C 0.041 0.155 0.312 0.600 0.795 0.883 0.915 0.928
Group B 0.018 0.150 0.311 0.657 0.854 0.872 0.859 0.860
we do not find statistically significant differences (at the 5% level) in the responder’s
acceptance decisions for a given offer amount (using a Fisher’s exact test) between groups
A and C, except for the offer of £3 in the direct-response treatment and for the offers of
£1 and £6 in the strategy treatment. When we pool the responder’s behavior of groups A
and C and compare it to group B’s, we do not find any statistically significant difference
(at the 5% level) in the direct-response treatment for any of the offer amounts except for
£4, but find that the acceptance rate of group B is statistically significantly lower than
that of pooled groups A and C for all offer amounts in the strategy method treatment.
The difference ranges between 2.9 (offer of 4) and 16.9 (offer of 7) percentage points.
A.1 Comparison with Gu¨th et al. (1982)’s Findings
The finding that most subjects are role-reversal consistent is in line with the findings
of Gu¨th et al. (1982), although our and their experimental designs are different. In the
design of Gu¨th et al. (1982), subjects play both the proposer and responder roles simultane-
ously, which differs from our role-reversal design, and the responder states their minimum
acceptable offer without knowing the proposer’s offer, which is also different from our
direct-response method. Gu¨th et al.’s (1982) subjects were asked to simultaneously write
down their demands as proposer and responder.
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Gu¨th et al. (1982) call a subject’s demands consistent (which Gu¨th and Kliemt (2010)
refer to as intra-personal coherent) if the subject’s demand as proposer and responder sum
up to the total amount to be divided. In their sample of 37 subjects, they found 15 subjects
(40.5%) whose demands were consistent. Gu¨th et al.’s (1982) definition of consistency is
what we would call strict-consistency. A subject is strict-consistent if the offer she makes
a proposer is the lowest offer she always accepts as a responder (regardless of whether she
rejects higher offers). We find that 51.6% (66/128) of subjects in our direct-response
treatment and 30.0%(45/150) in the strategy method treatment are strict-consistent. The
result is comparable to Gu¨th et al. (1982)’s finding considering the difference between the
two designs. The higher rate of strict consistency in our direct-response treatment might
have to do with the fact that 35 subjects did not receive offers £1 lower than their own
offers. Therefore, we assume that the offer such subjects make is the lowest they would
accept. If we exclude these subjects from the analysis, our strict-consistency rate in the
direct-response treatment becomes 33.3% (31/93).
On the other hand, Gu¨th et al. (1982) call a subject’s demands conflict (anti-conflict)
when the sum of a subject’s demand as proposer and responder is greater (smaller) than
the total amount to be divided. In their sample of 37 subjects, they found 5 subjects
whose demands were in conflict and 17 which were in anti-conflict. Since both of their
“consistent” and “anti-conflict” demands are role-reversal consistent according to our def-
inition24, in their experiment 86.5% of the subjects were role-reversal consistent, which is
also comparable to our finding that a large majority of subjects are role-reversal consistent.
A.2 Projection Bias
Given the one-shot nature of the game and the lack of information about the responders,
the proposer’s self is the (probably only) important and reasonable source in forming the
belief about the opponents’ behavior (Hoch, 1987). Under the notion of projection bias,
a subject’s belief as a proposer about the responders would coincide with her own would-
be behavior as a responder. In our experiment, projection bias implies that the agent
holds a belief about her opponent’s behavior that mimics the agent’s own behavior in the
opponent’s role. Our data provides evidence of projection bias in a one-shot asymmetric
24Note that any subject who is in anti-conflict in Gu¨th et al. (1982)’s sense cannot be strictly consistent
by our definition, as it would necessarily mean that a subject’s as a responder is willing to accept lower
offers than her own offer as a proposer.
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game. First, we find in the strategy method treatment, subjects’ stated probabilities of
acceptance are not statistically different from their behavior, for the majority of offer
amounts. For 76.0% of the subjects in the strategy method treatment we cannot reject
the null hypothesis (using a binomial test) that the subject’s belief about the conditional
acceptance rate of an offer is the same as her behavior as a responder for 5 out of the
8 offer amounts, which accounts for the majority of the offer amounts. Unfortunately,
this test cannot be done in the direct-response treatment, because subjects as responders
decide on ten different actual offers, (not ten times for each offer amount, as in the strategy
treatment), and therefore a binomial test for each offer amount would rely on an extremely
small sample size. Second, the subject’s stated probability of acceptance plummeted going
from the offer she accepted to the one she rejected as a responder. We find that for the
subjects who use cut-off strategies, their stated probability of acceptance of an offer by
the responder increases more between the offer amount one pound below the subject’s cut-
off and the cut-off amount, than between any other two consecutive offer amounts. The
average of the increase of the belief about the probability of acceptance is 30.03 percentage
points (p.p.), while it is only 16.17 percentage points from the offer two pounds below
the cut-off to the offer one pound below the subject’s cut-off, and 19.91 percentage points
from the cut-off offer to the offer one pound above the cut-off. Although this evidence
is suggestive of projection bias, it is not definitive because of limitations with statistical
testing.
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Appendix B Instructions – Introductory remarks (com-
mon to both treatments)
WELCOME!
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision-making. Universities have
provided the funds for this experiment.
In this experiment we will first ask you to read instructions that explain the decision
scenarios you will be faced with. Next, you will be asked to make decisions that will allow
you to earn money.
Your monetary earnings will be determined by your decisions and the decisions of other
participants in the experiment. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you
in private, in cash, after today’s session. Your earnings will be kept strictly anonymous.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If
you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to
leave and you will forfeit your earnings. Thank you.
The experiment consists of three parts, parts I, II and III. You will participate in two
parts. In each part in which you participate, you will anonymously interact with other
participants in the room. For the entire experiment today, you will not interact with any
participant more than once. Thus, if you interact with a participant in one part, you will
not interact with him/her in the other part in which you participate. The decisions that
you make in a part will NEITHER influence the decisions you will be faced with NOR the
participants you will interact with in the next part in which you participate.
We will now randomly determine the two parts in which you will participate.
You will participate in parts <? > and <? >.
Appendix C Instructions – Feedback Treatment
Instructions for Proposers - Offer stage
In this part, you will be asked to decide how to split £7 with each of ten other partic-
ipants. That is, for each pairing with another participant, you will propose £X for you,
and £(7-X) for her/him (X has to be a whole number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6,
7)).
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For each pairing, upon being informed of how you want to split the £7, the other partic-
ipant will either accept or not accept your proposed split. If the other participant accepts
your proposed split you will receive £X, and s/he will receive £(7-X). If the other partic-
ipant does not accept your proposed split, you will receive £0, and the other participant
will receive £0.
In summary, you will make one proposal that will be sent to ten other participants.
Each of them will separately and independently decide whether to accept or reject your
proposal.
After your proposal has been made and accepted or rejected by each of the ten partic-
ipants who receive it, you will be informed about each of their decisions.
Two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly at the end of the session, and you
will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus, the chance that you will be paid for
a particular outcome is one in five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also
has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the experiment.
Instructions for Responders
In this part, you will receive ten proposals, each from a different participant, on how to
split £7 with her/him. That is, for each of ten pairings with other participants, you will
receive a proposal of £Y for you, and £(7-Y) for her/him (Y has to be a whole number
between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6, 7)).
For each pairing, upon being informed of how the other participant wants to split the
£7, you will either accept her/his proposed split, or will not accept it. If you accept the
proposed split you will receive £Y, and s/he will receive £(7-Y). If you do not accept the
proposed split, you will receive £0, and the other participant will receive £0.
In summary, you will receive ten proposals made separately and independently by ten
different participants. You will then decide whether to accept or reject each of the ten
proposals you receive.
After you have made a decision on each of the ten proposals you receive, each of the
other participants will be informed of the outcome of his or her own proposal (but not that
of others’).
Two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly at the end of the session, and you
will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus, the chance that you will be paid for
a particular outcome is one in five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also
has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the experiment.
Instructions for Idle-Subjects
You are not participating in this part.
Please be patient and wait until this part is over.
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Appendix D Instructions – No-Feedback Treatment
Instructions for Proposers - Offer stage
In this part, you will be asked to decide how to split £7 with each of ten other partic-
ipants. That is, for each pairing with another participant, you will propose £X for you,
and £(7-X) for her/him (X has to be a whole number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6,
7)).
For each pairing, the other participant will not be shown your proposed split, but
instead will be asked to accept or not accept each of the eight feasible splits ((£0 for you,
and £7 for her/him), (£1 for you, and £6 for her/him), . . . , (£7 for you, and £0 for
her/him)). upon being informed of how you want to split the £7, the other participant
will either accept or not accept your proposed split. If the other participant accepts your
proposed split you will receive £X, and s/he will receive £(7-X). If the other participant
does not accept your proposed split, you will receive £0, and the other participant will
receive £0.
In summary, you will make one proposal that will be sent to ten other participants.
Each of them will separately and independently have to decide whether they would accept
or reject each of the feasible proposed splits.
After your proposal has been made, and each of the ten other participants to whom you
are paired has decided whether they would accept or reject each of the feasible proposed
splits, your proposal will be matched to each of their accept/reject decisions for your
proposed split, and an outcome for each pairing will be determined. You will only be
informed about the outcomes at the end of the session.
Moreover, at the end of the session, two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly,
and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus, the chance that you will be
paid for a particular outcome is one in five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant
also has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the experiment.
Instructions for Responders
In this part, each of ten participants will make a proposal on how to split £7 between
you and her/him. That is, for each of ten pairings with other participants, each of the 10
participants paired to you will make a proposal of £Y for you, and £(7-Y) for her/him (Y
has to be a whole number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6, 7)).
Since you will not be informed how each of the other participant wants to split the £7
between you and her/him, you will be asked to decide whether you would accept or not
accept each of the eight feasible splits ((£0 for you, and £7 for her/him), (£1 for you, and
£6 for her/him), . . . , (£7 for you, and £0 for her/him)). For each of the feasible splits
if you accept it you will receive £Y, and s/he will receive £(7-Y), if £Y is the amount
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proposed to you. If you do not accept the proposed split, you will receive £0, and the
other participant will receive £0.
In summary, ten different participants will separately and independently each make a
proposal on how to split £7 with you. Since you will not see the proposals you will be
asked to decide for each of them whether to accept or reject each of the feasible splits.
After you have decided whether you would accept or reject each of the feasible splits,
each of the ten proposals will be matched to your accept/reject decision for the proposed
split, and an outcome for each pairing will be determined. You will only be informed about
the outcomes at the end of the session.
Moreover, at the end of the session, two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly,
and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus, the chance that you will be
paid for a particular outcome is one in five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant
also has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the experiment.
Instructions for Idle-Subjects
You are not participating in this part.
Please be patient and wait until this part is over.
Appendix E Instructions for Proposers’ Belief Elici-
tation stage (common to both treatments)
To finish this part we now ask you to give us your ESTIMATE about the chance a randomly
chosen participant would accept each of the different feasible splits. Specifically, we ask you
for each feasible split, how likely do you think that some other participant would accept
it?
You will be asked to answer with a percentage number. If you are absolutely sure that
that other participant would ACCEPT the proposed split, then you would want to answer
with 100%. If you think it is absolutely certain that the other participant would REJECT
the proposed split, then you would want to answer with 0%. If you are less certain that that
other participant would ACCEPT the proposed split, then you would want to respond with
an intermediate percentage number, reflecting what you think. A higher number would
indicate a stronger tendency towards acceptance, and a lower number would indicate a
stronger tendency towards rejection.
You will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimates, as follows:
First, we will randomly select two proposed splits (drawn from the pool of proposals
made by all the participants making proposals, including you) received by two participants
who were asked to reject or accept them.
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Second, for each of the two proposed splits selected, we compute your reward which is
equal to 100 points (each point is worth one pence), minus a number “L” (short for “loss”)
that indicates how well your estimate indicates the decision made by the participant who
faced that proposed split.
This number L is determined in several simple steps. The first step is to identify the
decision of the participant who received the proposal, i.e., we look up whether s/he accepted
or rejected that proposed split. If it was ACCEPT, we take the difference between 100 and
your estimate (which we call “ESTIMATE” in the following formula).
Then, this difference is multiplied by itself, and then multiplied by 0.01, yielding the
number L.
If, on the other hand, the actual value of that other participant was REJECT, then
we simply take your ESTIMATE, multiplied by itself and then by 0.01, to arrive at the
number L. Expressed as a formula, your earnings from the estimate are therefore given by:
100− L, where:
• if the other participant’s decision was ACCEPT: L = 0.01× (100− ESTIMATE)×
(100− ESTIMATE);
• if the other participant’s decision was REJECT: L = 0.01×ESTIMATE×ESTIMATE.
You can convince yourself that with this formula, you will earn an amount between
£0.00 and £1.00, and that you will earn more money if your ESTIMATE is closer to
indicating correctly the other participant’s DECISION. It will therefore pay off for you to
report a good guess. In fact, your expected earnings are maximal if you report truthfully
what you think is the chance that the other participant ACCEPTED the proposed split.
(We skip a more mathematical version of this property, and you can trust us on this. But
fairly obviously, it has to do with the fact that L is a positive number, and that it is smaller
the better is your estimate.)
Example: Suppose that the other participant ACCEPTS the proposed split choice (this
decision is hypothetical, and not the actual decision of that other participant). Your task
is to estimate this decision - you earn more points if your estimate better reflects the other
participant’s decision. With the above formula, you can verify that for this given outcome
of the other participant’s decision, you would receive:
• 100 points, if your estimate of the other participant’s decision ACCEPTING the
proposed split is 100%, or
• 100−9 = 91 points, if your estimate of the other participant’s decision ACCEPTING
the proposed split is 70%, or
• 100−81 = 19 points if your estimate of the other participant’s decision ACCEPTING
the proposed split is 10%.
30
If you have a question on this procedure, please raise your hand. Otherwise, please
give us now your estimates that the other participant would ACCEPT each of the feasible
splits (a percentage number between 0% and 100%).
If for some reason you want to change any of your decisions, simply re-enter a new
number. You have to confirm your decisions (by clicking the OK button) to make them
final. Once you confirm your decisions you will not be able to change them.
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Appendix F Screenshots
Figure 2: Proposers’ decision screen in both treatments
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Figure 3: Responders’ decision screen in the response treatment
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Figure 4: Responders’ initial decision screen for pairing #1 (optional 2nd screen for pairings #2 to #10) in the
strategy treatment
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Figure 5: Responders’ decision screen for pairings #2 to #10 in the strategy treatment
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Figure 6: Proposers’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments
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